Difference between revisions of "Anarchy 31/Anarchism and the cybernetics of self-organising systems"
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{{p|s1}}<div style="text-align:justify;">{{sc|The intention of this article}} is to suggest that some of the con­cepts used by {{w|cyber­neti­cians|Cybernetics}} study­ing evolv­ing self-<wbr>organ­ising systems may be relev­ant to anarch­ist theory, and that some of the con­clu­sions drawn from this study tend to favour liber­tarian models of social organ­isa­tion. Much of the spe­cific­ally cyber­netic ma­terial is drawn from lectures given by {{w|Gordon Pask|Gordon_Pask}} and {{w|Stafford Beer|Stafford_Beer}} at {{w|Salford College of Advanced Technology|University_of_Salford}}. They are not, of course, respons­ible for any con­clu­sions drawn, except where expli­citly stated. | {{p|s1}}<div style="text-align:justify;">{{sc|The intention of this article}} is to suggest that some of the con­cepts used by {{w|cyber­neti­cians|Cybernetics}} study­ing evolv­ing self-<wbr>organ­ising systems may be relev­ant to anarch­ist theory, and that some of the con­clu­sions drawn from this study tend to favour liber­tarian models of social organ­isa­tion. Much of the spe­cific­ally cyber­netic ma­terial is drawn from lectures given by {{w|Gordon Pask|Gordon_Pask}} and {{w|Stafford Beer|Stafford_Beer}} at {{w|Salford College of Advanced Technology|University_of_Salford}}. They are not, of course, respons­ible for any con­clu­sions drawn, except where expli­citly stated. | ||
− | {{tab}}Firstly, what do we mean by a self-<wbr>organ­ising system? One defini­tion is simply {{q|a system in which to ''order'' in­creases as time passes}}, that is, in which the ratio of the ''variety'' ex­hibited to the max­imum possible variety de­creases; variety being a measure of the com­plex­ity of the system as it appears to an ob­server, the uncer­tainty for the ob­server regard­ing its beha­viour. A system with large variety will have a larger number of pos­sible states than one with smaller variety. Thus such a system may start by ex­hibit­ing very varied beha­viour, ''e.g.''<!-- 'e.g.' not in italics in original --> a large number of dif­fer­ent re­sponses to a given stim­ulus may appear equally likely, but over a period of time the heha­viour becomes less erratic, more pre­dict­able{{dash}}fewer and fewer dis­tinct re­sponses to a given stim­ulus are pos­sible (or, better, have a sig­nific­antly high prob­abil­ity.) | + | {{tab}}Firstly, what do we mean by a self-<wbr>organ­ising system? One defini­tion is simply {{q|a system in which to ''order'' in­creases as time passes}}, that is, in which the ratio of the ''{{w|variety|Variety_(cybernetics)}}'' ex­hibited to the max­imum possible variety de­creases; variety being a measure of the com­plex­ity of the system as it appears to an ob­server, the uncer­tainty for the ob­server regard­ing its beha­viour. A system with large variety will have a larger number of pos­sible states than one with smaller variety. Thus such a system may start by ex­hibit­ing very varied beha­viour, ''e.g.''<!-- 'e.g.' not in italics in original --> a large number of dif­fer­ent re­sponses to a given stim­ulus may appear equally likely, but over a period of time the heha­viour becomes less erratic, more pre­dict­able{{dash}}fewer and fewer dis­tinct re­sponses to a given stim­ulus are pos­sible (or, better, have a sig­nific­antly high prob­abil­ity.) |
− | {{tab}}This def­ini­tion is, however, in osme ways re­strict­ive. The best such a system can do is to reach some sort of op­timum state and stay there. Also, if we regard the system as a control system at­tempt­ing to main­tain stabil­ity in a fluctu­ating en­viron­ment, the types of dis­turb­ance with which it can deal are limited by the fixed max­imum variety of the system. This point will be dealt with later. The essen­tial thing is that unpre­dict­able dis­turb­ances are liable to prove too much for the system. | + | {{tab}}This def­ini­tion is, however, in osme ways re­strict­ive. The best such a system can do is to reach some sort of op­timum state and stay there. Also, if we regard the system as a {{w|control system|Control_system}} at­tempt­ing to main­tain stabil­ity in a fluctu­ating en­viron­ment, the types of dis­turb­ance with which it can deal are limited by the fixed max­imum variety of the system. This point will be dealt with later. The essen­tial thing is that unpre­dict­able dis­turb­ances are liable to prove too much for the system. |
{{tab}}Such con­sidera­tions suggest that it would be more fruit­ful to in­corpor­ate in the defini­tion the idea that the max­imum pos­sible variety might also differ at dif­fer­ent times. Thus Pask re­stricts the term to situa­tions where the history of {{q|the system}} can best be repre­sented as a series S₀ S₁ … S''ₙ''<!-- 'n' not subscript in original --> each term a system with fixed max­imum variety, and each self-organising in the first sense. With this defini­tion we are {{p|271}}able to deal with control systems of the type found in living organ­isms. Indeed, with a few limited excep­tions, bio­logical and social organ­isa­tion are, up to now, the only fields in which such control systems can be found. Some of the excep­tions, in the shape of ar­tifi­cially con­structed systems, despite their crude and ele­ment­ary nature in com­par­ison with living organ­isms, do however exhibit re­mark­ably ad­vanced beha­viour, at least in com­par­ison with con­ven­tional con­trol­lers. | {{tab}}Such con­sidera­tions suggest that it would be more fruit­ful to in­corpor­ate in the defini­tion the idea that the max­imum pos­sible variety might also differ at dif­fer­ent times. Thus Pask re­stricts the term to situa­tions where the history of {{q|the system}} can best be repre­sented as a series S₀ S₁ … S''ₙ''<!-- 'n' not subscript in original --> each term a system with fixed max­imum variety, and each self-organising in the first sense. With this defini­tion we are {{p|271}}able to deal with control systems of the type found in living organ­isms. Indeed, with a few limited excep­tions, bio­logical and social organ­isa­tion are, up to now, the only fields in which such control systems can be found. Some of the excep­tions, in the shape of ar­tifi­cially con­structed systems, despite their crude and ele­ment­ary nature in com­par­ison with living organ­isms, do however exhibit re­mark­ably ad­vanced beha­viour, at least in com­par­ison with con­ven­tional con­trol­lers. | ||
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{{tab}}Regard­ing the group as a de­cision maker, Pask sug­gests that this is perhaps the only sense in which {{q|two heads are better than one}} is true{{dash}}if the {{q|two heads}} con­sti­tute a self-<wbr>organ­ising system. The clue as to why a number of heads, ''e.g.'', notori­ously, in com­mit­tees, often turn out to be much worse than one, is, he sug­gests, this busi­ness of role as­sign­ment and stereo­typed pro­ced­ure. He has not, however, sug­gested why this should arise. | {{tab}}Regard­ing the group as a de­cision maker, Pask sug­gests that this is perhaps the only sense in which {{q|two heads are better than one}} is true{{dash}}if the {{q|two heads}} con­sti­tute a self-<wbr>organ­ising system. The clue as to why a number of heads, ''e.g.'', notori­ously, in com­mit­tees, often turn out to be much worse than one, is, he sug­gests, this busi­ness of role as­sign­ment and stereo­typed pro­ced­ure. He has not, however, sug­gested why this should arise. | ||
− | {{tab}}Drawing on know­ledge of beha­viour of a self-<wbr>organ­ising nature {{p|274}}ex­hibited in other groups, ''e.g.'' in­formal shop-<wbr>floor organ­isa­tion, the adapt­abil­ity and effi­ciency ex­hibited in in­stances of col­ | + | {{tab}}Drawing on know­ledge of beha­viour of a self-<wbr>organ­ising nature {{p|274}}ex­hibited in other groups, ''e.g.'' in­formal shop-<wbr>floor organ­isa­tion, the adapt­abil­ity and effi­ciency ex­hibited in in­stances of col­lect­ive con­tract working, and similar phe­nomena,<ref>See, for example, the paper by {{w|Trist|Eric_Trist}} on col­lect­ive con­tract working in the {{w|Durham|County_Durham}} coal­field quoted by {{w|H. Clegg|Hugh_Clegg_(industrial_relations)}} in '''A New Ap­proach to Indus­trial Demo­cracy''' (Black­well 1960) and the dis­cus­sion of this book by [[Author:Geoffrey Ostergaard|Geoffrey Oster­gaard]] in [[Anarchy 2/Approaches to industrial democracy|ANARCHY 2]]. Note the ap­pear­ance of new ele­ments of job rota­tion.<br>{{tab}}Despite his empha­sis on the formal aspects of worker organ­isa­tion, {{w|Melman|Seymour_Melman}}{{s}} ana­lysis (see Note 1) of the worker de­cision pro­cess at {{w|Standard{{s}}|Standard_Motor_Company}} brings out many of the carac­ter­istics of a self-<wbr>organ­ising system: the evolving nature of the process; the diffi­culty of de­termin­ing where a par­tic­ular de­cision was made; chan­ging domin­ance; the way in which the cumul­ative ex­peri­ence of the group changes the frame of refer­ence against which subse­quent prob­lems are set for solu­tion. A better idea of the gang system from which this derives can, however, be ob­tained from [[Author:Reg Wright|Reg Wright]]{{s}} articles in [[Anarchy 2/The gang system in Coventry|ANARCHY 2]] & [[Anarchy 8/Erosion inside capitalism|8]].</ref> we may perhaps offer some sug­ges­tions as to how insti­tu­tional­isa­tion may arise in certain types of circum­stances. |
{{tab}}Imagine a work­shop of reason­able size, in which a number of con­nec­ted pro­cesses are going on, and where there is some vari­ation in the factors af­fact­ing the work to be taken into ac­count. There is con­sider­able evid­ence that the workers in such a shop, working as a co-<wbr>oper­ating group, are able to organ­ise them­selves without outside inter­fer­ence, in such a way as to cope effi­ciently with the job, and show re­mark­able facil­ity in coping with un­fore­see­able diffi­culties and disrup­tions of normal pro­cedure. | {{tab}}Imagine a work­shop of reason­able size, in which a number of con­nec­ted pro­cesses are going on, and where there is some vari­ation in the factors af­fact­ing the work to be taken into ac­count. There is con­sider­able evid­ence that the workers in such a shop, working as a co-<wbr>oper­ating group, are able to organ­ise them­selves without outside inter­fer­ence, in such a way as to cope effi­ciently with the job, and show re­mark­able facil­ity in coping with un­fore­see­able diffi­culties and disrup­tions of normal pro­cedure. | ||
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{{p|276}}{{tab}}I now wish to return from this ques­tion of small group organ­isa­tion to that of larger systems, and con­sider some criti­cisms of con­ven­tional indus­trial organ­isa­tion de­veloped, in par­tic­ular, by Stafford Beer. He main­tains that con­ven­tional ideas of control in complex situa­tions, such as an indus­trial company, or the economy of a country, are crude and inade­quate. {{qq|The fact is,}} he says, {{qq|that our whole concept of control is naive, primit­ive, and ridden with an almost retrib­utive idea of caus­al­ity. Control to most people (and what a re­flec­tion this is upon a soph­istic­ated society!) is a crude process of coer­cion.}}<ref>{{w|Beer|Stafford_Beer}} [[#cite_note-2|'''{{popup|op. cit.|opere citato: cited above}}''']] p.21.</ref> | {{p|276}}{{tab}}I now wish to return from this ques­tion of small group organ­isa­tion to that of larger systems, and con­sider some criti­cisms of con­ven­tional indus­trial organ­isa­tion de­veloped, in par­tic­ular, by Stafford Beer. He main­tains that con­ven­tional ideas of control in complex situa­tions, such as an indus­trial company, or the economy of a country, are crude and inade­quate. {{qq|The fact is,}} he says, {{qq|that our whole concept of control is naive, primit­ive, and ridden with an almost retrib­utive idea of caus­al­ity. Control to most people (and what a re­flec­tion this is upon a soph­istic­ated society!) is a crude process of coer­cion.}}<ref>{{w|Beer|Stafford_Beer}} [[#cite_note-2|'''{{popup|op. cit.|opere citato: cited above}}''']] p.21.</ref> | ||
+ | |||
+ | {{tab}}In the lecture re­ferred to earlier, his main thesis was the im­possi­bil­ity of truly effi­cient control of a complex under­taking by the type of rigid hier­archic organ­isa­tion with which we are at present famil­iar. That such systems manage to survive, and work in some sort of manner, as they obvi­ously do, is, he sug­gested, due to the fact that they are not en­tirely what they are sup­posed to be{{dash}}that there are un­offi­cial self-<wbr>organ­ising systems and tend­en­cies in the organ­isa­tion which are essen­tial to its sur­vival. | ||
+ | |||
+ | {{tab}}Beer is un­usu­ally per­cept­ive, and frank, in em­phas­ising the preva­lence and im­port­ance of un­offi­cial ini­tiat­ives at all levels, ''e.g.'' (of shop-<wbr>floor workers). {{qq|They arrange things which would horrify man­age­ment, if they ever found out}}, (of charge-<wbr>hands, etc.) {{qq|If ''they'' did not talk things over and come to mutual agree­ments, the whole busi­ness would col­lapse.}} | ||
+ | |||
+ | {{tab}}The main key­stones in Beer{{s}} argu­ment are {{w|Ashby|W._Ross_Ashby}}{{s}} {{q|{{w|Prin­ciple of Re­quis­ite Variety|Variety_(cybernetics)#The_Law_of_Requisite_Variety}}}} from the theory of homeo­stasis, and in­forma­tion-<wbr>theor­etic re­quire­ments for ade­quate channel cap­acity in a multi-<wbr>level system. | ||
+ | |||
+ | {{tab}}The prin­ciple of re­quis­ite variety states that, if stabil­ity is to be at­tained, the variety of the con­trol­ling system must be at least as great as the variety of the system to be con­trolled. We have already had an in­stance of this, for this was really the trouble with our hypo­thet­ical com­mit­tee: due to its rigid struc­ture and the need to issue in­struc­tions in terms of stand­ard pro­ced­ures to be adopted, it could not pos­sibly be effi­cient in a situ­ation of any com­plex­ity. If we made the further as­sump­tion that there was no organ­isa­tion of the work group other than that imposed by the com­mit­tee, chaos would be un­avoid­able. Ap­proxi­ma­tions to this occur in {{q|{{w|working to rule|Work-to-rule}}}}. In normal working, the ini­tiat­ives of the shop-<wbr>floor workers would serve as an addi­tional source of variety, this en­abling the prin­ciple of re­quis­ite variety to be satis­fied, at least as far as normal vari­ations in the factors af­fect­ing the pro­duc­tion situ­ation were con­cerned. | ||
+ | |||
+ | {{tab}}The relev­ance of the re­quire­ments of channel cap­acity is to the in­ade­quate, atten­uated in­forma­tion avail­able at the top of the hier­archy{{dash|this is in­evit­able, for, in prac­tice, the channel cap­acity could never be made ade­quate in the sort of pyr­amidical struc­tures we have}}and also to the in­ade­quacy of the formal channels be­tween sub­systems (''e.g.'' depart­ments) which require to co-<wbr>ordin­ate their activ­ities. | ||
+ | |||
+ | {{tab}}To em­phas­ise how far con­ven­tional mana­gerial ideas of organ­isa­tion are from satis­fying the prin­ciple of re­quis­ite variety, Beer used an {{p|277}}amusing parable con­cern­ing a Martian visitor to Earth, who exam­ines the activ­ities at the lower levels of some large under­taking, the brains of the workers con­cerned, and the organ­isa­tional chart pur­port­ing to show how the under­taking is con­trolled. The visitor is most im­pressed, and deduces that the creatures at the top of the hier­archy must have heads yards wide. | ||
+ | |||
+ | {{tab}}In dis­cus­sing the at­tempts of an in­ade­quate control system to control a system of greater variety, Beer pointed to the accum­ula­tion of unas­simil­able in­forma­tion likely to occur as the control vainly strug­gles to keep track of the situ­ation. | ||
+ | |||
+ | {{tab}}A compar­able con­verse phe­nomenon was pointed out by {{w|Proudhon|Pierre-Joseph_Proudhon}} in 1851, in what must rank as one of the most proph­etic state­ments about the de­velop­ment of social organ­isa­tion ever written: {{qq|(The gov­ern­ment) must make as many laws as it finds in­terests, and, as in­terests are in­numer­able, ''rela­tions arising from one another mul­tiply to infin­ity,'' and ant­agon­ism is endless, law­making must go on without stop­ping. Laws, decrees, ordin­ances, re­solu­tions, will fall like hail upon the un­fortun­ate people. After a time the polit­ical ground will be covered by a layer of paper, which the geo­logists will put down among the vicis­situdes of the earth as the ''papyr­aceous forma­tion''.}}<ref>{{w|P.-J. Proudhon|Pierre-Joseph_Proudhon}}: '''{{l|The General Idea of the Revolu­tion in the Nine­teenth Century|http://fair-use.org/p-j-proudhon/general-idea-of-the-revolution/}}''' (Freedom Press, 1923).</ref> (The first italics are mine.) | ||
+ | |||
+ | {{tab}}This is also an early, and lucid, state­ment of the com­plex­ity of the control situ­ation in social organ­isa­tion. | ||
+ | |||
+ | {{tab}}Beer has some sug­gest­ive ideas on the ques­tion of cent­ral­isa­tion ''vs.'' de­central­isa­tion in indus­try. (That is, cent­ral­isa­tion of control. The ques­tion of cent­ral­isa­tion of ''plant'' is a differ­ent, if re­lated, problem.) He puts the di­lemma thus: | ||
+ | |||
+ | {{hang|Cent­ral­ise: in­suffi­cient channel cap­acity, etc.{{dash}}cannot work effi­ciently.}} | ||
+ | |||
+ | {{hang|De­central­ise: com­pletely autonom­ous units{{dash}}no cohe­sion, prob­ably ceases to be a system at all.<!-- no period in original -->}} | ||
+ | |||
+ | {{tab}}The point, he sug­gests is that neither altern­ative corres­ponds to what we find in really effi­cient systems, ''i.e.'' complex living organ­isms. What we do find are a number of differ­ent, inter­locking control systems. Beer also draws atten­tion to the pre­val­ence, and im­port­ance, of re­dun­dancy of poten­tial com­mand in self-<wbr>organ­ising systems, and points out that it is com­pletely alien to the sort of theory of organ­isa­tion found in indus­try and in similar under­takings. | ||
+ | |||
+ | {{tab}}The type of organ­isa­tion at which we should aim is, he sug­gests, an organic one, in­volving inter­locking control systems, inter­meshing at all levels, util­ising the prin­ciple of evolving self-<wbr>organ­ising systems, with the channel cap­acity and flow of in­forma­tion kept as high as pos­sible.<ref>Compare also the con­clud­ing section of {{w|Pask|Gordon_Pask}}{{s}} '''An Ap­proach to Cyber­netics,''' in par­ticu­lar the dis­cus­sion of a {{q|bio­logic­ally organ­ised}} factory.</ref> | ||
+ | |||
+ | {{tab}}He men­tioned in this con­nec­tion an Amer­ican busi­ness­man who claimed that his busi­ness was, in part, organ­ised along some­what similar lines and seemed to work very well. The idea was that anybody at all, no matter how {{q|junior}} (I do not know whether this was actu­ally re­stric­ted to what are termed {{q|staff}} or not), could call a con­fer­ence at short notice, to discuss any­thing they wanted, whether con­nected with {{p|278}}their work or not. Such a meeting could call in the pres­ident of the company himself, or anyone they thought they needed. | ||
----- | ----- | ||
− | <font size="2">{{note|aster|*}} {{q|best suited}} that is from the point of view of the group. | + | <font size="2">{{hang|{{note|aster|*}} {{q|best suited}} that is from the point of view of the group.}} |
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{{DEFAULTSORT:Anarchism and the cybernetics of self organising systems}} | {{DEFAULTSORT:Anarchism and the cybernetics of self organising systems}} | ||
[[Category:Anarchist philosophy]] | [[Category:Anarchist philosophy]] | ||
+ | [[Category:Cybernetics]] | ||
+ | [[Category:Labour and industry]] | ||
[[Category:Articles]] | [[Category:Articles]] |
Revision as of 16:07, 3 April 2017
Anarchism and the
cybernetics of self-organising
systems
Firstly, what do we mean by a self-
This definition is, however, in osme ways restrictive. The best such a system can do is to reach some sort of optimum state and stay there. Also, if we regard the system as a control system attempting to maintain stability in a fluctuating environment, the types of disturbance with which it can deal are limited by the fixed maximum variety of the system. This point will be dealt with later. The essential thing is that unpredictable disturbances are liable to prove too much for the system.
Such considerations suggest that it would be more fruitful to incorporate in the definition the idea that the maximum possible variety might also differ at different times. Thus Pask restricts the term to situations where the history of ‘the system’ can best be represented as a series S₀ S₁ … Sₙ each term a system with fixed maximum variety, and each self-organising in the first sense. With this definition we are For an example of self-
In many discussions of control situations the concept of ‘Hierarchy’ appears very quickly. This may tend to make the anarchist recoil, but should not do so, since the usage is a technical one and does not coincide with the use of the term in anarchist criticisms of political organisation.
Firstly, the cybernetician makes a very important distinction between two types of hierarchy, the anatomical and the functional, to use the terminology adopted by Pask. The former is the type exemplified in part by hierarchical social organisation in the normal sense (e.g. ‘tree of command’ structure in industry), that is: there are two (if two levels) actual distinguishable concrete entities involved. The latter refers to the case where there may be only one entity, but there are two or more levels of information structure operating in the system—
Secondly, even in the case of ‘anatomical hierarchy’, the term only means that parts of the system can be distinguished dealing with different levels of decision making and learning, e.g. some parts may deal directly with the environment, while other parts relate to activity of these first parts, or some parts learn about individual occurrences, while others learn about sequences of individual occurrences, and others again about classes of sequences.
Even in the anatomical sense, then, the term need have none of the connotations of coercive sanctions in a ruler-
An important phenomenon in self-
Prior to this Pask had developed individual teaching machines which were important advances in the growth of applied cybernetics.[3] However, on considering the problem of group teaching (for skills where some calculable measure of the pupils’ performance, the rate of change of which will serve as a suitable indication of learning, exists), he did not simply combine individual machines.
The important insight he had was that a group of human beings in a learning situation, is itself an evolutionary system, which suggested the idea of the machine as a catalyst, modifying the communication channels in the group, and thus producing different group structures.
In the development of the individual teaching machines, the possibility of the pupil dominating the machine had already arisen. This Pask now extended by introducing the idea of a quality ‘money’ allocated to each member of the group, and used by each of them to ‘buy’ for himself control over the communication structure of the group and over the partial specification of the solution provided by the machine. Now, in the individual machine, the degree to which the pupil was helped was coupled to change of his degree of success. If he was becoming more successful then the help given was decreased. In the group machine, the allocation of ‘money’ is coupled to two conditions—
The system, then, has changing dominance and exhibits redundancy of potential command.
In practice, each pupil sits in a little cubicle provided with buttons and indicators for communication, and a computer is used for control, calculating the various measures, etc. The operator is provided with some way of seeing what is going on, and can deliberately make things difficult for the group, by introducing false information into the channels, etc., seeing how the group copes with it.
The problems which Pask, at the time, had used in these group experiments had been formulated as conveying information about the position of a point in some space, with noise in the communication channels. The group had been asked to imagine that they are air traffic controllers, given co-
It will be noted that the state of the system when in equilibrium is the solution to the problem. Also that this solution changes with time. This is also the case in the first example from purely human organisation which occurred to me—
Pask emphasised that he had not then had the opportunity to obtain sufficient data to make any far-
Some groups, after an initial stage while they were gaining familiarity with the machine, began assigning specific roles to their members and introducing standard procedures. This led to a drop in efficiency and inability to handle new factors introduced by spurious information, etc. The learning curve rises, flattens, then drops sharply whenever some new element is introduced. The system is now no longer self-
Necessary characteristics for a group to constituted self-
I think we might sum up ‘fixed role assignment and stereotyped procedures’ in one word—
Note that these characteristics are necessary, not sufficient—
The role of the computer in Pask’s system may be worrying some. Is his not an analogue of an authoritarian ‘guiding hand’? The answer is, I think, no. It must be remembered that this is an artificial exercise the group is performing. A problem is set by the operator. There is therefore no real situation in actuality for the group to affect and observe the result of their efforts. It is this function of determining and feeding back success/
The other important aspect of the machine as a catalyst in the learning process, we have already mentioned. There is a rough analogy here with the role of ‘influence leader’ in the Hausers’ sense,[4] rather than any authoritarian ‘overseer’. I will return to this question of the role of the machine shortly.
Regarding the group as a decision maker, Pask suggests that this is perhaps the only sense in which ‘two heads are better than one’ is true—
Imagine a workshop of reasonable size, in which a number of connected processes are going on, and where there is some variation in the factors affacting the work to be taken into account. There is considerable evidence that the workers in such a shop, working as a co-
There are two levels of task here:
- The complex of actual production tasks.
- The task of solving the problem of how the group should be organised to perform these first level tasks, and how information about them should be dealt with by the group.
In situations of the kind I am imagining, the organisation of the group is largely determined by the needs of the job, which are fairly obvious to all concerned. There is continual feed-
Purely for the purpose of illustration, let us now consider the situation of the same type of shop, only this time assuming that it is organised by a committee from outside the shop. The situation in which the committee finds itself is completely different from that of the work group. There are now three levels of problem:
- The problems solved by the individual workers, i.e. their jobs.
- The problem of the organisation of the work group.
- The problem of the organisation of the committee itself.
The determining success/
The committee is denied the continuous feed-
In theory, such a controller could still remain an adoptive self-
In practice, however, the committee promptly convene a meeting, assign specific functions and decide on standard procedures. The actual determining information is probably a mixture of personality factors (including externally deprived status) and the existing ideas on organisation theory (including local precedent) possessed by the members. Once decided they will shelve the third level problem unless disaster, or a new superior, strikes, when a similar, but more cumbersome, procedure will be necessary to re-
In other words, within the cosed system of the committee and work group, there is no, or virtually no, coupling between the success of the actual undertaking, i.e. the production job, and the decision procedure solving the third level problem. Worse, the factors influencing the solution of this problem, far from increasing the possible variety of the committee, lead to rigidity and low variety. Owing to this structure it will generally prove less efficient than a single imaginative person.
We might suggest, then, that it is this isolation from the process in terms of which the success of their own activity is defined, which is generally typical of the committee situation, which leads to their common failure to exhibit self-
Consider the first case of the self-
In the lecture referred to earlier, his main thesis was the impossibility of truly efficient control of a complex undertaking by the type of rigid hierarchic organisation with which we are at present familiar. That such systems manage to survive, and work in some sort of manner, as they obviously do, is, he suggested, due to the fact that they are not entirely what they are supposed to be—
Beer is unusually perceptive, and frank, in emphasising the prevalence and importance of unofficial initiatives at all levels, e.g. (of shop-
The main keystones in Beer’s argument are Ashby’s ‘Principle of Requisite Variety’ from the theory of homeostasis, and information-
The principle of requisite variety states that, if stability is to be attained, the variety of the controlling system must be at least as great as the variety of the system to be controlled. We have already had an instance of this, for this was really the trouble with our hypothetical committee: due to its rigid structure and the need to issue instructions in terms of standard procedures to be adopted, it could not possibly be efficient in a situation of any complexity. If we made the further assumption that there was no organisation of the work group other than that imposed by the committee, chaos would be unavoidable. Approximations to this occur in ‘working to rule’. In normal working, the initiatives of the shop-
The relevance of the requirements of channel capacity is to the inadequate, attenuated information available at the top of the hierarchy—
In discussing the attempts of an inadequate control system to control a system of greater variety, Beer pointed to the accumulation of unassimilable information likely to occur as the control vainly struggles to keep track of the situation.
A comparable converse phenomenon was pointed out by Proudhon in 1851, in what must rank as one of the most prophetic statements about the development of social organisation ever written: “(The government) must make as many laws as it finds interests, and, as interests are innumerable, relations arising from one another multiply to infinity, and antagonism is endless, lawmaking must go on without stopping. Laws, decrees, ordinances, resolutions, will fall like hail upon the unfortunate people. After a time the political ground will be covered by a layer of paper, which the geologists will put down among the vicissitudes of the earth as the papyraceous formation.”[7] (The first italics are mine.)
This is also an early, and lucid, statement of the complexity of the control situation in social organisation.
Beer has some suggestive ideas on the question of centralisation vs. decentralisation in industry. (That is, centralisation of control. The question of centralisation of plant is a different, if related, problem.) He puts the dilemma thus:
The point, he suggests is that neither alternative corresponds to what we find in really efficient systems, i.e. complex living organisms. What we do find are a number of different, interlocking control systems. Beer also draws attention to the prevalence, and importance, of redundancy of potential command in self-
The type of organisation at which we should aim is, he suggests, an organic one, involving interlocking control systems, intermeshing at all levels, utilising the principle of evolving self-
- ↑ See Seymour Melman: Decision-Making and Productivity (Blackwell, 1958).
- ↑ Gordon Pask: “Interaction between a Group of Subjects and an Adaptive Automaton to produce a Self-
Organising System for Decision-Making” in the symposium Self- Organising Systems, 1962, ed. Jovits, Jacobi and Goldstein (Spartan Books). - ↑ See Stafford Beer: Cybernetics and Management (English Universities Press, 1959) pp.123-127, and Gordon Pask: An Approach to Cybernetics (Hutchinson 1961).
- ↑ See Richard and Hephzibah Hauser: The Fraternal Society (Bodley Head, 1962).
- ↑ See, for example, the paper by Trist on collective contract working in the Durham coalfield quoted by H. Clegg in A New Approach to Industrial Democracy (Blackwell 1960) and the discussion of this book by Geoffrey Ostergaard in ANARCHY 2. Note the appearance of new elements of job rotation.
Despite his emphasis on the formal aspects of worker organisation, Melman’s analysis (see Note 1) of the worker decision process at Standard’s brings out many of the caracteristics of a self-organising system: the evolving nature of the process; the difficulty of determining where a particular decision was made; changing dominance; the way in which the cumulative experience of the group changes the frame of reference against which subsequent problems are set for solution. A better idea of the gang system from which this derives can, however, be obtained from Reg Wright’s articles in ANARCHY 2 & 8. - ↑ Beer op. cit. p.21.
- ↑ P.-J. Proudhon: The General Idea of the Revolution in the Nineteenth Century (Freedom Press, 1923).
- ↑ Compare also the concluding section of Pask’s An Approach to Cybernetics, in particular the discussion of a ‘biologically organised’ factory.