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By “meliorism” I understand a certain kind of social activity or behaviour—
a kind of activity which is distinguished from other kinds of activity, not so much by any quality or style of the activity itself, but by its having certain ends or aims. Meliorist activity is that activity which has as its end, or is aimed at, some social improvement. This account of what meliorism is agrees, I think, substantially with that of
Molnar’s.
It might, however, be queried by some libertarians. They would argue that meliorist activity has a certain style—it involves a certain mode of behaviour, it has a certain intrinsic character. The adjectives “servile”, “conformist”, “devious”, etc., spring to mind as ways that libertarians hae characterised what they take to be the intrinsic character of meliorism. However, to define meliorism as activity carried out in this manner would be to beg the question against those who claim that one can achieve worthwhile results in the social sphere without, as it were, sacrificing one’s personal integrity in the process. And it does seem to be an empirical question which we should not pre-judge whether or not meliorism is always accompanied by a certain characteristic style of behaviour. It seems best, therefore, to adopt as a starting point a general characterisation of meliorism as that activity directed towards the end of social improvement.
Libertarians have in the past been averse to taking part in meliorist activity; they have usually, though not always, been content to air their grievances without trying to remedy them. Molnar has argued for a substantial modification of this attitude. He has based his position on an examination and criticism of certain arguments which he takes to be used as support for the libertarian attitude, and which he claims do not in fact support that attitude.
I agree with Molnar to this extent:
if the libertarian opposition to meliorism is based on the arguments that he considers, then that opposition is not justified. To the extent that libertarians have defended their anti-
meliorism by resorting to these considerations, then their defence has been an inadequate one. But, against this, I want to argue that the libertarian aversion to meliorism is based on considerations which Molnar ignores, and that these are crucial for an understanding of the libertarian attitude. I will further suggest that these considerations are basic to libertarianism—
basic in the sense that if one were to reject them one would cease to be a libertarian. As a consequence of this, where Molnar suggests that libertarianism and meliorism—
albeit of a restrained and selective kind—
are compatible, I will argue that they are incompatible. Where Molnar asks that we reject the general
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question “What is wrong with meliorism?”, I think we should accept it, and try to answer it.
This will involve going oer some pretty familiar material. Still, it seems worth going over if just to give it a certain emphasis which might be missed. It is also necessary because it seems that it is just this familiar material that Molnar has chosen to ignore.
Libertarians, as we know, are anarchists, though admittedly anarchists of a rather strange breeed. Before we get into those elements in libertarian thinking which distinguish them from other anarchists, it will be as well to stress at least one element in libertarian thinking which they share with classical anarchists. This is, of course, the enormous, perhaps inordinate, stress on freedom—freedom, that set of conditions in which human activity can be carried on unhindered, and in which individual and group interests can be expressed without barrier. Together with this is the correlative opposition to those forces and institutions which limit that freedom. Whereas other political anarchists and libertarians hae held out in the name of complete freedom, and have maintained, or tried to maintain, an uncompromising attitude towards those forces that stand in the way of that freedom.
It is because libertarians try to maintain this position that they are anarchists; if they ceased to hold this position they would cease to be anarchists—they would be ratbags of a different kind. What I want to stress is that this attitude is basic to libertarianism, and because it is an attitude it is not, as such, subject to argument or proof. Libertarians just have this attitude: it is their starting point. It is not the conclusion of an argument, nor a terminus arrived at from the consideration of premises.
Given that libertarians qualify as anarchists because of this basic common ground, we can now point out how libertarians differ from most other anarchists, certainly from those in the classical tradition. Libertarians believe that the achievement of a society in which this ideal of freedom is realised is impossible; they believe that no amount of propaganda, education, or political struggle will bring about a society even remotely resembling the anarchist utopia. (I don’t want to consider questions as to how this belief is justified. I think it is justified, though I think that the justification is not quite as straightforward a matter as libertarians have tended to believe. But this is by the way.) The point is that it is this belief that distinguishes libertarians from other anarchists, just as it is the uncompromising attitude towards freedom that distinguishes libertarians and anarchists from other political creeds.
Years ago, Molnar himself
pointed out (
Libertarian No. I (1957), p. 12) that the classical anarchists were not just utopian dreamers, but that there was another strand in their thought. On occasion, they stressed the reality of the present and actual engagement with authority, of the immediate struggle for emancipation, rather than the far distant, perhaps illusory, utopia, which they conceived to be the outcome of that struggle. It was in this mood that
Bakunin Bakunin wrote: “to think of the future is criminal”. And it is this strain in anarchist thinking which
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is attractive to libertarians. But with an important difference. The anarchists usually thought of their activity as a means to a certain end—
the establishment of a free society. Libertarians, although they believe that that end is impossible, nevertheless continue with activity which is similar in kind to that of the anarchists
because they see that activity as an end in itself.
Libertarians are concerned with the content of their activity, i.e., its quality as such, and are not concerned with the ends that it may or may not achieve. Libertarians see certain sorts of action as expressive of their belief in freedom; being free is, in a sense, acting in a certain way. They are concerned with the activity, not for what it is hoped that it will bring about, but because they think that it is worth doing for its own sake. That is, I believe, the content, or an important part of the content, of the notion of permanent protest.
Of course, this does not apply, nor is it meant to apply, to all activity undertaken by libertarians. It does not, for instance, apply to that activity which is concerned just with the mundane task of living, e.g., drinking, eating, etc. But it certainly does apply to activity in the socio-political sphere. There may well be difficulties in demarcating this area precisely, but perhaps it will be sufficient in this context to say that it is just that area in which we are being invited to participate in “restrained and selective” meliorism.
Given all this, we can immediately see the opposition or, perhaps better, the lack of contact between the meliorist and the libertarian. Meliorists and reformers are concerned with ends—their activity is calculated to achieve certain results. For the meliorist, the style of the activity, the manner in which it is carried out must, to some extent, be subordinate to the ends that he hopes to achieve by that activity. This is because meliorist activity is activity directed towards change or improvement, i.e., the end must govern to some, though perhaps only a limited extent, the means. If this is not the case, then the activity is wrongly described as being meliorist. Libertarians, on the other hand, are concerned with a certain kind of style of activity, and the consequences of this activity are a subordinate consideration. It may be that some activity undertaken by libertarians will have as a consequence some improvement of the social scene; it may also be the case that its consequence is some change that we would not regard as an improvement; much more likely, it will not have any important consequences at all. But all these considerations concerning the outcome of the activity will be subordinate to questions concerning the character of the activity as such. It is this difference of emphasis which sets the libertarian apart from the meliorist—even the “restrained and selective” meliorist.
Molnar, in the course of his paper, considered and rejected certain views which might be held to buttress an anti-
meliorist stance. I have agreed that, as they stand, these considerations do not support a general opposition to meliorism. However, in the light of what I have said so far, some at least can be reformulated so as to appear much more plausible, ot perhaps as arguments in their own right,
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but as adjuncts to the basic position. For example, Molnar, in my view quite correctly, rejected the thesis that meliorism is ineffective. As a universal generalisation this appears to be plainly false. But what is more plausible, and what, perhaps, is meant by many who have made this claim, is the view that libertarian activity, if it is to be considered meliorist, will be seen as ineffective meliorism.
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