Difference between revisions of "Anarchy 85/Meliorism—a reply"

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<div style="max-width:500px; margin:auto;"><font size="2"><div style="text-align:justify;">''{{p|83}}{{tab}}By {{qq|melio&shy;rism}} I under&shy;stand a certain kind of social acti&shy;vity or beha&shy;viour{{dash}}a kind of acti&shy;vity which is dis&shy;tin&shy;guished from other kinds of acti&shy;vity, not so much by any quality or style of the acti&shy;vity itself, but by its having certain ends or aims. Melio&shy;rist acti&shy;vity is that acti&shy;vity which has as its end, or is aimed at, some social im&shy;prove&shy;ment. This account of what melio&shy;rism is agrees, I think, sub&shy;stan&shy;tial&shy;ly with that of [[/Meliorism|Molnar{{s}}]].
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<div style="max-width:500px; margin:auto;"><font size="2"><div style="text-align:justify;">{{p|83}}{{tab}}By {{qq|melio&shy;rism}} I under&shy;stand a certain kind of social acti&shy;vity or beha&shy;viour{{dash}}a kind of acti&shy;vity which is dis&shy;tin&shy;guished from other kinds of acti&shy;vity, not so much by any quality or style of the acti&shy;vity itself, but by its having certain ends or aims. Melio&shy;rist acti&shy;vity is that acti&shy;vity which has as its end, or is aimed at, some social im&shy;prove&shy;ment. This account of what melio&shy;rism is agrees, I think, sub&shy;stan&shy;tial&shy;ly with that of [[../Meliorism|Molnar{{s}}]].
  
 
{{tab}}It might, however, be queried by some liber&shy;tari&shy;ans. They would argue that melio&shy;rist acti&shy;vity has a certain style{{dash}}it in&shy;volves a certain mode of beha&shy;viour, it has a certain in&shy;trin&shy;sic cha&shy;rac&shy;ter. The adjec&shy;tives {{qq|servile}}, {{qq|con&shy;for&shy;mist}}, {{qq|devious}}, etc., spring to mind as ways that liber&shy;tari&shy;ans hae cha&shy;rac&shy;ter&shy;ised what they take to be the in&shy;trin&shy;sic cha&shy;rac&shy;ter of melio&shy;rism. However, to define melio&shy;rism as acti&shy;vity carried out in this manner would be to beg the ques&shy;tion against those who claim that one can achieve worth&shy;while results in the social sphere without, as it were, sacri&shy;fi&shy;cing one{{s}} personal integ&shy;rity in the process. And it does seem to be an empi&shy;rical ques&shy;tion which we should not pre-<wbr>judge whether or not melio&shy;rism is always accom&shy;pa&shy;nied by a certain cha&shy;rac&shy;teris&shy;tic style of beha&shy;viour. It seems best, there&shy;fore, to adopt as a star&shy;ting point a general cha&shy;rac&shy;teri&shy;sa&shy;tion of melio&shy;rism as that acti&shy;vity direc&shy;ted towards the end of social im&shy;prove&shy;ment.
 
{{tab}}It might, however, be queried by some liber&shy;tari&shy;ans. They would argue that melio&shy;rist acti&shy;vity has a certain style{{dash}}it in&shy;volves a certain mode of beha&shy;viour, it has a certain in&shy;trin&shy;sic cha&shy;rac&shy;ter. The adjec&shy;tives {{qq|servile}}, {{qq|con&shy;for&shy;mist}}, {{qq|devious}}, etc., spring to mind as ways that liber&shy;tari&shy;ans hae cha&shy;rac&shy;ter&shy;ised what they take to be the in&shy;trin&shy;sic cha&shy;rac&shy;ter of melio&shy;rism. However, to define melio&shy;rism as acti&shy;vity carried out in this manner would be to beg the ques&shy;tion against those who claim that one can achieve worth&shy;while results in the social sphere without, as it were, sacri&shy;fi&shy;cing one{{s}} personal integ&shy;rity in the process. And it does seem to be an empi&shy;rical ques&shy;tion which we should not pre-<wbr>judge whether or not melio&shy;rism is always accom&shy;pa&shy;nied by a certain cha&shy;rac&shy;teris&shy;tic style of beha&shy;viour. It seems best, there&shy;fore, to adopt as a star&shy;ting point a general cha&shy;rac&shy;teri&shy;sa&shy;tion of melio&shy;rism as that acti&shy;vity direc&shy;ted towards the end of social im&shy;prove&shy;ment.
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{{tab}}Of course, this does not apply, nor is it meant to apply, to all acti&shy;vity under&shy;taken by liber&shy;tari&shy;ans. It does not, for in&shy;stance, apply to that acti&shy;vity which is con&shy;cerned ''just'' with the mundane task of living, e.g., drin&shy;king, eating, etc. But it cer&shy;tain&shy;ly does apply to acti&shy;vity in the socio-<wbr>poli&shy;tical sphere. There may well be diffi&shy;cul&shy;ties in demar&shy;ca&shy;ting this area pre&shy;cise&shy;ly, but perhaps it will be suf&shy;fi&shy;cient in this context to say that it is just that area in which we are being invited to parti&shy;ci&shy;pate in {{qq|res&shy;trained and selec&shy;tive}} melio&shy;rism.
 
{{tab}}Of course, this does not apply, nor is it meant to apply, to all acti&shy;vity under&shy;taken by liber&shy;tari&shy;ans. It does not, for in&shy;stance, apply to that acti&shy;vity which is con&shy;cerned ''just'' with the mundane task of living, e.g., drin&shy;king, eating, etc. But it cer&shy;tain&shy;ly does apply to acti&shy;vity in the socio-<wbr>poli&shy;tical sphere. There may well be diffi&shy;cul&shy;ties in demar&shy;ca&shy;ting this area pre&shy;cise&shy;ly, but perhaps it will be suf&shy;fi&shy;cient in this context to say that it is just that area in which we are being invited to parti&shy;ci&shy;pate in {{qq|res&shy;trained and selec&shy;tive}} melio&shy;rism.
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{{tab}}Given all this, we can imme&shy;di&shy;ately see the oppo&shy;si&shy;tion or, perhaps better, the lack of contact between the melio&shy;rist and the liber&shy;ta&shy;rian. Melio&shy;rists and refor&shy;mers are con&shy;cerned with ''ends''{{dash}}their acti&shy;vity is cal&shy;cula&shy;ted to achieve certain results. For the melio&shy;rist, the style of the acti&shy;vity, the manner in which it is carried out must, to some extent, be subor&shy;di&shy;nate to the ends that he hopes to achieve by that acti&shy;vity. This is because melio&shy;rist acti&shy;vity is acti&shy;vity direc&shy;ted towards change or im&shy;prove&shy;ment, i.e., the end must govern to some, though perhaps only a limited extent, the means. If this is not the case, then the acti&shy;vity is wrongly des&shy;cribed as being melio&shy;rist. Liber&shy;tari&shy;ans, on the other hand, are con&shy;cerned with a certain kind of style of acti&shy;vity, and the conse&shy;quen&shy;ces of this acti&shy;vity are a subor&shy;di&shy;nate consi&shy;dera&shy;tion. It may be that some acti&shy;vity under&shy;taken by liber&shy;tari&shy;ans will have as a conse&shy;quence some im&shy;prove&shy;ment of the social scene; it may also be the case that its conse&shy;quence is some change that we would not regard as an im&shy;prove&shy;ment; much more likely, it will not have any impor&shy;tant conse&shy;quen&shy;ces at all. But all these consi&shy;dera&shy;tions con&shy;cer&shy;ning the out&shy;come of the acti&shy;vity will be subor&shy;di&shy;nate to ques&shy;tions con&shy;cer&shy;ning the cha&shy;rac&shy;ter of the acti&shy;vity as such. It is this dif&shy;fer&shy;ence of empha&shy;sis which sets the liber&shy;ta&shy;rian apart from the melio&shy;rist{{dash}}even the {{qq|res&shy;trained and selec&shy;tive}} melio&shy;rist.
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Molnar, in the course of his paper, consi&shy;dered and rejec&shy;ted certain views which might be held to but&shy;tress an anti-<wbr>melio&shy;rist stance. I have agreed that, as they stand, these consi&shy;dera&shy;tions do not support a general oppo&shy;si&shy;tion to melio&shy;rism. However, in the light of what I have said so far, some at least can be refor&shy;mula&shy;ted so as to appear much more plau&shy;sible, ot perhaps as argu&shy;ments in their own right, {{p|86}}but as ad&shy;juncts to the basic posi&shy;tion. For example, Molnar, in my view quite cor&shy;rect&shy;ly, rejec&shy;ted the thesis that melio&shy;rism is inef&shy;fec&shy;tive. As a uni&shy;ver&shy;sal gene&shy;rali&shy;sa&shy;tion this appears to be plainly false. But what is more plau&shy;sible, and what, perhaps, is meant by many who have made this claim, is the view that liber&shy;ta&shy;rian acti&shy;vity, if it is to be consi&shy;dered melio&shy;rist, will be seen as inef&shy;fec&shy;tive melio&shy;rism.
  
  

Revision as of 12:39, 6 December 2016

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  By “melio­rism” I under­stand a certain kind of social acti­vity or beha­viour—a kind of acti­vity which is dis­tin­guished from other kinds of acti­vity, not so much by any quality or style of the acti­vity itself, but by its having certain ends or aims. Melio­rist acti­vity is that acti­vity which has as its end, or is aimed at, some social im­prove­ment. This account of what melio­rism is agrees, I think, sub­stan­tial­ly with that of Molnar’s.

  It might, however, be queried by some liber­tari­ans. They would argue that melio­rist acti­vity has a certain style—it in­volves a certain mode of beha­viour, it has a certain in­trin­sic cha­rac­ter. The adjec­tives “servile”, “con­for­mist”, “devious”, etc., spring to mind as ways that liber­tari­ans hae cha­rac­ter­ised what they take to be the in­trin­sic cha­rac­ter of melio­rism. However, to define melio­rism as acti­vity carried out in this manner would be to beg the ques­tion against those who claim that one can achieve worth­while results in the social sphere without, as it were, sacri­fi­cing one’s personal integ­rity in the process. And it does seem to be an empi­rical ques­tion which we should not pre-judge whether or not melio­rism is always accom­pa­nied by a certain cha­rac­teris­tic style of beha­viour. It seems best, there­fore, to adopt as a star­ting point a general cha­rac­teri­sa­tion of melio­rism as that acti­vity direc­ted towards the end of social im­prove­ment.

  Liber­tari­ans have in the past been averse to taking part in melio­rist acti­vity; they have usually, though not always, been content to air their grie­van­ces without trying to remedy them. Molnar has argued for a sub­stan­tial modi­fica­tion of this atti­tude. He has based his posi­tion on an exa­mina­tion and criti­cism of certain argu­ments which he takes to be used as support for the liber­ta­rian atti­tude, and which he claims do not in fact support that atti­tude.

  I agree with Molnar to this extent: if the liber­ta­rian oppo­si­tion to melio­rism is based on the argu­ments that he consi­ders, then that oppo­si­tion is not jus­ti­fied. To the extent that liber­tari­ans have defen­ded their anti-melio­rism by resor­ting to these consi­dera­tions, then their defence has been an in­ade­quate one. But, against this, I want to argue that the liber­ta­rian aver­sion to melio­rism is based on consi­dera­tions which Molnar ignores, and that these are crucial for an under­stan­ding of the liber­ta­rian atti­tude. I will further suggest that these consi­dera­tions are basic to liber­tari­anism—basic in the sense that if one were to reject them one would cease to be a liber­ta­rian. As a conse­quence of this, where Molnar sug­gests that liber­tari­anism and melio­rism—albeit of a res­trained and selec­tive kind—are compa­tible, I will argue that they are incom­pa­tible. Where Molnar asks that we reject the general
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ques­tion “What is wrong with melio­rism?”, I think we should accept it, and try to answer it.

  This will involve going oer some pretty fami­liar mate­rial. Still, it seems worth going over if just to give it a certain empha­sis which might be missed. It is also neces­sary because it seems that it is just this fami­liar mate­rial that Molnar has chosen to ignore.

  Liberta­rians, as we know, are anar­chists, though admit­ted­ly anar­chists of a rather strange breeed. Before we get into those ele­ments in liber­ta­rian thin­king which dis­tin­guish them from other anar­chists, it will be as well to stress at least one element in liber­ta­rian thin­king which they share with clas­sical anar­chists. This is, of course, the enor­mous, perhaps inor­di­nate, stress on freedom—freedom, that set of condi­tions in which human acti­vity can be carried on unhin­dered, and in which indi­vi­dual and group inte­rests can be ex­pressed without barrier. Toge­ther with this is the corre­la­tive oppo­si­tion to those forces and insti­tu­tions which limit that freedom. Whereas other poli­tical anar­chists and liber­tari­ans hae held out in the name of complete freedom, and have main­tained, or tried to main­tain, an uncom­promi­sing atti­tude towards those forces that stand in the way of that freedom.

  It is because liber­tari­ans try to main­tain this posi­tion that they are anar­chists; if they ceased to hold this posi­tion they would cease to be anar­chists—they would be ratbags of a diffe­rent kind. What I want to stress is that this atti­tude is basic to liber­tari­anism, and because it is an atti­tude it is not, as such, subject to argu­ment or proof. Liber­tari­ans just have this atti­tude: it is their star­ting point. It is not the con­clu­sion of an argu­ment, nor a ter­mi­nus arrived at from the consi­dera­tion of pre­mi­ses.

  Given that liber­tari­ans qualify as anar­chists because of this basic common ground, we can now point out how liber­tari­ans differ from most other anar­chists, cer­tain­ly from those in the clas­sical tradi­tion. Liber­tari­ans believe that the a­chieve­ment of a society in which this ideal of freedom is rea­lised is impos­sible; they believe that no amount of propa­ganda, edu­ca­tion, or poli­tical strug­gle will bring about a society even re­mote­ly resem­bling the anar­chist utopia. (I don’t want to con­si­der ques­tions as to how this belief is justi­fied. I think it is justi­fied, though I think that the justi­fica­tion is not quite as straight­for­ward a matter as liber­tari­ans have tended to believe. But this is by the way.) The point is that it is this belief that dis­tin­gui­shes liber­tari­ans from other anar­chists, just as it is the uncom­promi­sing atti­tude towards freedom that dis­tin­gui­shes liber­tari­ans and anar­chists from other poli­tical creeds.

  Years ago, Molnar himself pointed out (Libertarian No. I (1957), p. 12) that the clas­sical anar­chists were not just utopian dream­ers, but that there was another strand in their thought. On occa­sion, they stressed the reality of the present and actual en­gage­ment with autho­rity, of the im­medi­ate strug­gle for eman­cipa­tion, rather than the far distant, perhaps illu­sory, utopia, which they con­ceived to be the outcome of that strug­gle. It was in this mood that Bakunin Bakunin wrote: “to think of the future is cri­mi­nal”. And it is this strain in anar­chist thin­king which
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is at­trac­tive to liber­tari­ans. But with an impor­tant diffe­rence. The anar­chists usually thought of their acti­vity as a means to a certain end—the estab­lish­ment of a free society. Liber­tari­ans, al­though they believe that that end is impos­sible, never­the­less con­tinue with acti­vity which is similar in kind to that of the anar­chists because they see that acti­vity as an end in itself.

  Liber­tari­ans are con­cerned with the content of their acti­vity, i.e., its quality as such, and are not con­cerned with the ends that it may or may not achieve. Liber­tari­ans see certain sorts of action as ex­pres­sive of their belief in freedom; being free is, in a sense, acting in a certain way. They are con­cerned with the acti­vity, not for what it is hoped that it will bring about, but because they think that it is worth doing for its own sake. That is, I believe, the content, or an impor­tant part of the content, of the notion of perma­nent protest.

  Of course, this does not apply, nor is it meant to apply, to all acti­vity under­taken by liber­tari­ans. It does not, for in­stance, apply to that acti­vity which is con­cerned just with the mundane task of living, e.g., drin­king, eating, etc. But it cer­tain­ly does apply to acti­vity in the socio-poli­tical sphere. There may well be diffi­cul­ties in demar­ca­ting this area pre­cise­ly, but perhaps it will be suf­fi­cient in this context to say that it is just that area in which we are being invited to parti­ci­pate in “res­trained and selec­tive” melio­rism.

  Given all this, we can imme­di­ately see the oppo­si­tion or, perhaps better, the lack of contact between the melio­rist and the liber­ta­rian. Melio­rists and refor­mers are con­cerned with endstheir acti­vity is cal­cula­ted to achieve certain results. For the melio­rist, the style of the acti­vity, the manner in which it is carried out must, to some extent, be subor­di­nate to the ends that he hopes to achieve by that acti­vity. This is because melio­rist acti­vity is acti­vity direc­ted towards change or im­prove­ment, i.e., the end must govern to some, though perhaps only a limited extent, the means. If this is not the case, then the acti­vity is wrongly des­cribed as being melio­rist. Liber­tari­ans, on the other hand, are con­cerned with a certain kind of style of acti­vity, and the conse­quen­ces of this acti­vity are a subor­di­nate consi­dera­tion. It may be that some acti­vity under­taken by liber­tari­ans will have as a conse­quence some im­prove­ment of the social scene; it may also be the case that its conse­quence is some change that we would not regard as an im­prove­ment; much more likely, it will not have any impor­tant conse­quen­ces at all. But all these consi­dera­tions con­cer­ning the out­come of the acti­vity will be subor­di­nate to ques­tions con­cer­ning the cha­rac­ter of the acti­vity as such. It is this dif­fer­ence of empha­sis which sets the liber­ta­rian apart from the melio­rist—even the “res­trained and selec­tive” melio­rist.

Molnar, in the course of his paper, consi­dered and rejec­ted certain views which might be held to but­tress an anti-melio­rist stance. I have agreed that, as they stand, these consi­dera­tions do not support a general oppo­si­tion to melio­rism. However, in the light of what I have said so far, some at least can be refor­mula­ted so as to appear much more plau­sible, ot perhaps as argu­ments in their own right,
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but as ad­juncts to the basic posi­tion. For example, Molnar, in my view quite cor­rect­ly, rejec­ted the thesis that melio­rism is inef­fec­tive. As a uni­ver­sal gene­rali­sa­tion this appears to be plainly false. But what is more plau­sible, and what, perhaps, is meant by many who have made this claim, is the view that liber­ta­rian acti­vity, if it is to be consi­dered melio­rist, will be seen as inef­fec­tive melio­rism.


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